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Does Australia Have a Coherent
Counter-Terrorist Strategy?
Andrew O’Neil1
Introduction
Does Australia have a coherent strategy to counter the threat of terrorism? This
question is rarely addressed in either academic circles or public commentary more
generally. It is certainly not a question that any level of Government is keen to focus
on publicly. Yet given the massive taxpayer dollars and political energy the Howard
Government has injected into combating terrorism2  since 9/11, along with the
substantive changes to domestic laws that impact on civil liberties, it is one of the
most critical policy-related questions of our time. In particular, ascertaining whether
the former Howard Government did everything within its power to mitigate the threat
of a terrorist strike against Australia’s onshore and offshore national assets is central
to assessing the degree of coherence underlying Australia’s counter-terrorist strategy.
Critics of Australia’s approach to counter-terrorism have tended to fall into two main
camps. The first comprises those who are concerned with highlighting what they
regard as the Howard Government’s over-reaction to the threat of terrorism in the form
of unnecessarily draconian legislation at the domestic level. A number of observers
who adhere to this perspective claim that the Howard Government has used the
“terrorist threat” as a pretext to reinforce its control over the domestic political agenda,
analogous to the way it exploited the border security issue in 2001 to outflank Labor
electorally.3  According to this view, the “threat” has been deliberately inflated by a
conservative government looking to exploit feelings of insecurity among ordinary
Australians.4  Some even claim that John Howard and his senior ministers have engaged
in “dog whistling” by subtly equating Muslims with terrorists in the hope of capitalising
on an underlying racism in the Australian electorate.5
The second camp endorses the view that Australia has compromised its capacity to
counter terrorist threats by becoming too closely involved in supporting the American-
led Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and associated (mis)adventures, especially the
invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003. Advocates of this position argue that
Australia’s “blind allegiance” to US global objectives has provoked a backlash among
Islamic jihadists, unnecessarily raising the risk of further attacks against Australia’s
on-shore and off-shore assets.6  This thesis claims that the Howard Government has
in fact acted directly against Australia’s interests by increasing the terrorist threat
through the irrational pursuit of closer ties with the United States. One commentator
has even claimed that the Government’s commitment in Iraq has been driven by
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Howard’s personal “romantic attachment to American civilization” rather than by any
“rational calculation”.7
In this paper I question both of these interpretations of Australia’s counter-terrorism
strategy as unduly reductionist. Contrary to the one-dimensional Government approach
to terrorism implied by some of the critics (i.e. mini-US version, conservative ruse to
suppress domestic dissent), Australia continues to pursue a suite of varied, overlapping
instruments as part of a fairly well defined counter-terrorist strategy. These instruments
are incorporated within three key pillars of strategy: domestic legislation, intelligence,
and regional assistance and engagement.8  While I argue that Australia’s counter-
terrorist strategy is characterised by greater policy coherence and deliberation than
many of the critics are willing to concede, I also identify several areas where the
Howard Government needed to devote increased emphasis. These included improving
Australia’s regional and international image through a more active use of public
diplomacy, and making a more persuasive case about how specific new anti-terror
laws will contribute to raising the practical threshold for terrorists seeking to target
Australian territory and national interests.
Defining and Benchmarking Counter-Terrorism
Since the end of the Cold War, international terrorism has evolved from being regarded
as a peripheral issue on the margins of the global threat spectrum to assuming a
central starring role in almost all discussions of international security.9  This dramatic
reconfiguration of the threat began to evolve well before the events of 9/11. The twin
shocks in 1995 of the Oklahoma City bombing by a ragtag US militia group and the
botched sarin gas attack in the Tokyo subway by the well-resourced Aum Shinrikyo
cult appeared to underscore the reality that modern terrorists were less concerned
about sending a political message, and more focussed on killing as many people as
possible in their attacks.10  This perception stoked widespread concern—some
probably justified, some clearly exaggerated—about whether “new” terrorists would
eventually avail themselves of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons for use in
mass casualty attacks on major urban centres.11  The increased attention devoted to
suicide terrorism has largely been a consequence of recent high profile attacks (9/11,
the first Bali attack in 2002, the 2005 London bombings), but has also reflected and
reinforced long-standing concerns over mass casualty terrorism.12
In broad brush terms, counter-terrorism can be defined as an instrument of state
policy that actively seeks to manage and degrade the risk of terrorist attacks against
national interests. Counter-terrorist strategy not only aims to disrupt planned attacks
before they occur, it ideally also endeavours to deter terrorists from planning such
attacks in the first place and, if necessary, use coercive measures to pre-empt terrorist
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threats from emerging. As Boaz Ganor points out, there are a number of alternative
goals, and several “sub-goals”, that drive states’ counter-terrorist strategies—eg
eradication of terrorism (addressing “root causes” of terrorism, destroying the
motivation of terrorist groups, completely eliminating terrorist enemies), damage control
(preventing certain kinds of attacks, minimising potential casualties and property
damage), and prevention of escalation (prevent worsening of attacks, prevent conflict
from spreading).13  In an increasingly globalised world, the protection of national
territory and state interests entails, by necessity, bilateral and multilateral counter-
terrorist cooperation between countries in the areas of intelligence gathering,
assessment, and distribution, law enforcement, and the coordination of domestic anti-
terrorism legislation.
While the literature on the changing nature of international terrorism is both plentiful
and varied, by comparison there has traditionally been something of a shortfall of
serious scholarly analysis of counter-terrorism. There remains, moreover, a striking
dearth of mainstream academic analysis on comparative counter-terrorism strategies
across different countries and regions. This is slowly changing, with the emergence of
some thoughtful analysis of counter-terrorist developments worldwide in recent years.14
Yet, surprisingly, there remains little meaningful theoretical scholarship on what
constitutes effective counter-terrorist strategy. Those studies that do address the
subject in detail are more concerned with America’s strategy since 9/11 and implications
for US policy than with exploring possible benchmarks for successful counter-terrorist
strategies internationally.15
As a consequence, analogous to the struggle to gain consensus on defining the term
“terrorism”, there is little agreement on what, if any, baseline criteria should exist for
assessing the success or otherwise of a state’s counter-terrorist strategy. The obvious
criterion for judging success, prevention of a terrorist attack, is virtually impossible to
affirm given the reluctance of governments to risk compromising intelligence methods
and sources to publicly substantiate a claim along these lines. The fact that Australian
territory has not been subject to a terrorist attack since the Sydney Hilton Hotel
bombing in 1978 may provide confirmation of the highly effective counter-terrorist
strategies of successive Governments over three decades. Or it could simply be that
Australian territory has not been targeted for an attack since 1978. Either way, from the
vantage point of an academic observing the processes of Government, there is simply
no way to verify whether counter-terrorist strategy has been (and continues to be)
successful via an examination of open sources on the public record.
This quandary would seem to negate altogether any point of examining the issue of
counter-terrorism in the Australian context. Perhaps Government officials should be
taken at their word when they reassure us that numerous plots have been foiled by
Journal of the AIPIO | 2007 | Volume 15, Number 2
AUST
RA
LIA
N
IN
ST
IT
UT
E
OF
PROFESSIONAL
INTELLIG
E
NCE
OFFICERS
15
authorities.16  Or perhaps not, given the all too convenient option of claiming, but not
demonstrating, success in the secretive world of counter-terrorism. Should we instead
give greater credence to those who argue that Australia’s “counter-terrorist” strategy
is little more than a useful tool for “the pre-emptive control of political conflict and
dissent”?17  This interpretation is too dismissive of the real risks of a terrorist attack on
Australian shores for my taste and errs excessively on the conspiratorial side. To
assume that the Australian Government is motivated by a desire to suppress legitimate
domestic dissent in framing its counter-terrorist strategy downplays the genuine
apprehension at all levels of Government over the prospect of a large-scale terrorist
attack against national interests inflicting potentially significant casualties among the
Australian population. Even if the motive of Government in seeking to prevent terrorist
attacks is less than pure—and there are certainly grounds for concluding that Ministers
at the Commonwealth and State level are very much focussed on being able to
demonstrate that they did everything within their power to prevent an attack should
one take place—there is scant evidence to assume that counter-terrorism is an elaborate
“whole of government” ruse to roll back civil liberties.
In rejecting both of the evaluative frameworks sketched above, the following analysis
assesses Australia’s contemporary counter-terrorist strategy according to the extent
to which there exists observable coherence (ie logic, consistency, minimal
contradictions, appropriate overlap) between the three pillars of that strategy: domestic
legislation, intelligence, and regional assistance and engagement.
The Fundamentals of Australias Approach
The Australian Government remains unequivocal in its denunciation of terrorism and
regards it as a strategic level threat to Australia.18  Readers of the 2003 Defence Update
2003 were left in no doubt as to the enormity of the challenge:
While terrorists lack the resources of the nation-state, particularly conventional military
forces, they have discovered that this is not a barrier to strategic effect. The reality is
that terrorism has gained strategic advantage by turning the strengths of tolerant and
open societies into weaknesses, and then striking at vulnerable points to devastating
effect. For Australians, this reality was brought home in Bali. There remains a great risk
that the mass casualties inflicted in recent attacks have set the terrorists’ sights even
higher, possibly including the acquisition and use of weapons of mass destruction.19
The former Howard Government outlined Australia’s overall approach to countering
terrorism as dual level in nature. While safeguarding domestic population centres and
infrastructure against attack or serious threat of attack remains central to counter-
terrorism strategy, the need to take the fight to terrorism beyond Australia’s shores is
equally important. In the words of former Defence Minister Robert Hill, “we have
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learnt that we cannot run away from terrorists. They must be defeated or they will
come to us”.20  While echoing US official views on the need to “take the fight to the
enemy, to keep them on the run”21 , this approach is in keeping with a strong tradition
in Australian strategic thought. The concept of confronting adversaries in theatres far
removed from national shores as part of coalition operations lay at the heart of the
post-Federation strategy of imperial defence and, later, Australia’s Cold War strategy
of forward defence.
As is the case with most other states, at the core of Australia’s counter-terrorist
strategy is effective management of the “threat assessment dilemma”, which can be
summarised as follows.22  On one level, government needs to be careful not to overstate
the threat from terrorism. The need to avoid doing the terrorists’ work for them by
fostering a climate of unnecessary fear and anxiety in the community, and alienating
important domestic constituencies useful to the gathering of intelligence are just
some of the specific challenges for governments. But, more importantly, as citizens
tend to dismiss each successive warning when the previous warnings fail to materialise.
On the other hand, the threat from terrorism cannot be underestimated to the extent
that government is deemed to be partly or even wholly culpable in the event of an
attack.23  The 2002 Bali attacks brought home forcefully to the Howard Government
that the Australian public believes Governments have a legal and moral obligation to
do all they can to protect the welfare of their citizens at home and abroad.24  As noted
above, this acts as a very powerful political incentive for Governments to be seen
doing all they can to prevent terrorist strikes.
The 9/11 attacks and subsequent Bali bombings in October 2002 prompted a
comprehensive review of Australia’s approach to combating terrorism. In addition to
raising the profile of terrorism in domestic political and foreign policy debates, 9/11
triggered a series of far-reaching initiatives designed to minimise obstacles to effective
counter-terrorist coordination across all levels of Government. The most significant
initiative was the creation of the National Counter-Terrorism Committee (NCTC) two
weeks after the Bali attacks.25  Comprising senior representatives from Government
departments, line agencies, and police services at the Commonwealth, State, and territory
levels, the NCTC’s role is to strengthen “inter-jurisdictional coordination” by
promoting “an effective nationwide counter-terrorism capability” and ensuring the
sharing of “relevant intelligence and information between agencies and jurisdictions”.26
It also has responsibility for instituting revisions to the National Counter-Terrorism
Plan (NCTP), the most recent iteration of which gained the imprimatur of the Council of
Australian Governments at its special meeting on counter-terrorism in September 2005.27
The NCTC also has responsibility for overseeing the (classified) National Counter-
Terrorism Handbook which “sets out in detail the relevant procedures and protocols
supporting the NCTP”.28
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Since 9/11, the Howard Government’s counter-terrorist strategy developed around
three key frameworks—domestic legislation, intelligence, and regional diplomacy. The
aim of the following sub-sections is to provide a stock take of each framework of the
Government’s strategy between 2001 and 2006 with a view to suggesting areas of
improvement in the final section of the paper.
Domestic Legislation
The most high profile, and by far the most controversial, element of Australia’s counter-
terrorist strategy has been the raft of anti-terrorist legislation and amendments to
existing Acts passed over the last half a decade. Driven by the Commonwealth, these
legislative initiatives have only been possible with the support of State and Territory
governments. In the wake of the Bali bombing in 2002, State and Territory Governments
agreed to “refer” legislative powers to the Commonwealth to allow it to legislate to
ensure jurisdictional uniformity in Australia’s anti-terrorism laws.29  Another important
factor has been support for the Government’s anti-terror legislative agenda from the
Federal Opposition. While the Opposition was able to insist on key amendments
before supporting legislation prior to the Howard Government gaining a majority in
the Senate on 1 July 2005, Labor has shown little inclination since then to oppose
legislative initiatives, throwing its support behind the Government’s Anti-Terrorism
Act 2005, much to the chagrin of opponents of the legislation.30
The major anti-terrorism legislative initiatives since 2001 have included amendments
to the Crimes Act 1914, the ASIO Act 1979, the Criminal Code Act 1995, and two
Anti-Terrorism Acts in 2004 and 2005.31  The overall impact of this legislation has been
threefold. First, it has lowered the barrier to authorities detaining and charging those
suspected of engaging in terrorism or having links with terrorists, even if no specific
act of terrorism has actually taken place. Second, it has increased the penalties for
individuals convicted of terrorism related offences—up to life imprisonment for those
who engage in or prepare or plan terrorist acts, and up to twenty-five years’ imprisonment
for those convicted of being a member or supporter of a terrorist organisation which
may or not appear on the Government’s list of proscribed organisations. The third net
effect of the legislation has been to grant Commonwealth and State police and the
Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) greater latitude in
determining the circumstances in which those suspected of involvement in terrorism
are monitored.
Intelligence
John Howard has stated that “timely and effective intelligence is the best weapon that
this country has against the terrorist threat to Australia”.32  While questions remain
about the politicisation of the Australian Intelligence Community (AIC) in the wake of
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the children overboard affair and the absence of WMD in Iraq33 , the Howard
Government has portrayed the role played by the AIC as the “front end” of Australia’s
counter-terrorist strategy. It is a virtual truism that accurate and timely intelligence
remain crucial to providing early warning of preparations for, or the impending execution
of, terrorist attacks. This has been reflected in the streamlining of Australia’s
intelligence agencies since 9/11 and the unprecedented resources diverted to the AIC,
particularly ASIO. Greater emphasis overall has been placed on analytical capabilities
relating to terrorism, with the lead Commonwealth agency, the Office of National
Assessments (ONA) establishing a Transnational Issues Branch devoted largely to
assessing terrorism trends worldwide, and operating as the AIC’s central point of
contact for liaising with foreign intelligence agencies on the issue.34  In May 2004, the
Howard Government opened the National Threat Assessment Centre in Canberra
which is designed to foster greater analytical input into ASIO threat assessments from
ONA, the Defence Intelligence Organisation, and the Australian Secret Intelligence
Service.35
In terms of playing a frontline role in implementing the Government’s counter-terrorism
strategy, ASIO remains the agency in the AIC responsible for preparing and distributing
threat assessments and specific warnings regarding terrorism via the Australian Secure
Network (ASNET). As noted above, ASIO has been granted substantially increased
legislative powers at the “active” level of monitoring terrorist suspects, but the culture
of the Organisation itself has also been recast significantly since 9/11 with almost
exclusive priority now accorded to fulfilling a dedicated counter-terrorism role. In
addition to its more traditional activity of monitoring suspected domestic threats,
ASIO has (of necessity) embraced a much more proactive outreach program to
Australia’s Muslim community. This has been aimed, at least in part, at breaking down
negative perceptions of internal security agencies in a community comprising many
immigrants from countries “where internal security agencies have reputations for
arbitrariness, brutality and corruption”.36  More broadly, of course, this outreach by
ASIO has also been aimed at cultivating reliable and enduring intelligence networks in
Australia’s Muslim community. But by far the most visible change has been ASIO’s
budgetary position. It now routinely receives around half of all funds allocated to the
AIC in federal budgets and its personnel numbers have more than doubled since 2001
and are projected to double again by 2010.37
Regional Assistance and Engagement
Rhetoric on the Middle East aside, Southeast Asia remains the single most important
region for Australia in its endeavours to prevent attacks against national targets
domestically and abroad. This region is home to the largest Muslim country in the
international system and is an acknowledged base for the group that perpetrated the
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2002 Bali attacks, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI).38  The Howard Government  made it clear that
it believed degrading the operational capacity of terrorist groups in Southeast Asia
will have a direct bearing on Australia’s capacity to protect national territory.39  It also
sought to counter terrorism in Australia’s immediate region at two integrated levels.
The first level has been the promotion of greater intelligence and law enforcement
cooperation links with states in the region, along with providing direct support for the
counter-terrorist strategies of individual states. This has included expanded intelligence
exchanges with like-minded states, particularly Singapore, The Philippines, and
Thailand, as well as enhanced cooperation with Indonesian authorities in bolstering
joint investigative and forensic evaluation techniques. To give institutional “ballast”
to these links, Australia has also concluded a series of counter-terrorist memoranda of
understanding with selected regional states, including Indonesia.40  In January 2003,
Australia was invited to join a regional counter-terrorism task force instituted by the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations aimed at enhancing regional communication
and making terrorism an extraditable offence in the region.41  The Howard Government
has also provided significant financial and in-kind support for the improvement of
states’ counter-terrorist capabilities in the areas of border control, anti-terrorist
financing, and transport security.42  In the 2006-07 federal budget, the Government
announced that it would provide an additional $92.6 million over the next four years to
specifically assist regional states improve their disaster response capacity and their
ability to prevent nuclear, chemical, biological, and radiological terrorist attacks.43
Renewed attention is also being devoted to helping regional governments formulate
“counter-radicalisation” strategies to counter extremist propaganda.44
The second level is the targeting of bilateral assistance packages with a view to
addressing some of the problems of poverty and related issues such as public health
in the region. Despite the Howard Government’s frequent public dismissals of any
causal link between poverty and terrorism, this sentiment is simply not reflected in
Australia’s aid program in Southeast Asia. Indeed, Australia’s overseas aid program
was quickly injected with a counter-terrorism dimension after Bali, with a 2003 AusAID
paper on the topic noting that “poverty, conflict and weak governance create
environments for the growth of terrorist networks”.45  The link between weak
governance and the emergence of terrorist havens was explicitly cited by Howard
himself as a reason for Australia’s decision to lead and largely finance the Regional
Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands in 2003.46  More recently, Australia’s $1
billion commitment to the Partnership for Reconstruction and Development to help
Indonesia recover from the 2004-05 tsunami was transparently aimed at contributing
to stability in the archipelago, improving Australia’s image, and minimising
opportunities for radical Islamists to exploit the societal and economic dislocation
engendered by the crisis.47
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The Road Ahead
Australia’s counter-terrorist strategy exhibits a degree of policy coherence that many
critics have been unwilling to acknowledge. As argued above, the three key pillars of
that strategy incorporate measures and initiatives designed to lower the risk of terrorist
attack against Australia. In terms of effectively managing the counter-terrorist “threat
assessment dilemma” outlined earlier in this paper, the Howard Government deserves
some limited credit (in addition to the specific criticisms outlined below). Contrary to
the view of some of its critics, senior Government Ministers have been assiduous in
reassuring the public that counter-terrorist measures, especially domestic legislation,
are not directed solely at the Muslim community and that Australia’s counter-terrorist
strategy more broadly is not anti-Islamic.48  Although condemned in some quarters for
allegedly targeting Australia’s Muslim community through permissive legislative
provisions that allow security agencies to monitor terrorist suspects, the Government
actually gained the support of the country’s peak Muslim representative group for its
Anti-Terrorism Act 2005.49  In this sense, the Government has played an important
role in discouraging a backlash against the country’s Muslim population with a view
to preserving social harmony, as well as an important source of future intelligence.
Moreover, in contrast with the US tendency to frequently upgrade terrorist attack alert
levels on occasionally less than convincing grounds50 , the Australian Government
has kept the national alert status at “medium” since introducing a four-tier alert system
when the first NCTP was finalised in June 2003.51  Unlike the United States, where
“alert fatigue” among ordinary citizens has become a real issue for government, there
is little doubt that any shift in the alert level in Australia would have a significant
impact on public vigilance. By resisting raising the national alert status following high
profile terrorist attacks in Madrid in March 2004, on Australia’s embassy in Jakarta in
September 2004, and on the London underground in July 2005, the Howard Government
has sought to safeguard the credibility of Australia’s terrorist threat alert regime.
However, despite the policy coherence underlying Australia’s counter-terrorist strategy,
the Howard Government needed to turn its attention to addressing some of the
weaknesses in its approach to terrorism at the domestic and foreign policy level. The
first weakness which the Government needed to address was its less than convincing
articulation of the case in favour of updating existing anti-terrorism legislation. This
writer endorses the logic that if one accepts the need for a counter-terrorist strategy,
then one also needs to accept that pursuing such a strategy will inevitably entail the
derogation of certain civil liberties. Thus quite often the issue is not whether certain
civil liberties are sacrificed, but rather the extent of this sacrifice. In an ideal world, law
abiding citizens would accept the derogation of specific civil liberties (eg authority for
security agencies to detain individuals suspected of possessing knowledge of a
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terrorist threat to the country) if the expected payoff is a more secure environment for
themselves and their loved ones. In this connection, the Howard Government needed
to be more explicit about why specific changes to domestic legislation will make it
harder for terrorists to attack Australian national assets.
Seeking to justify proposals for enhanced powers for security agencies and law
enforcement authorities following a governmental review of existing legislation in the
wake of the July 2005 London bombings, the Prime Minister noted vaguely that “the
proposed legislation is a combination of best practice from overseas and innovative
solutions that respond to Australia’s security needs”.52  At no point, however, did he
provide any explanation of why existing laws were inadequate to deal with the array of
potential threats from terrorist operatives (including suicide bombers), or how the new
proposals would raise the bar for those seeking to attack targets within Australia. The
Howard Government’s unfortunate decision to gag Parliamentary debate on the Anti-
Terrorism Act 2005 in early December by claiming that it was important the new laws
be passed before Parliament adjourned for the year merely reinforced the concerns of
those who were already uneasy about devolving greater authority to security agencies
to monitor and detain those suspected of involvement in terrorist acts.53  One initiative
the Government could have taken was to release selective information to the public—
without compromising intelligence sources and methods—demonstrating how laws
which have already been passed have worked in practice to make Australia more
secure from terrorist attack. Rather than engaging in vague justifications for new laws
that impact on civil liberties, the Howard Government needed to be more transparent
about how these laws will make the country more secure from terrorism. If it was
unable to come up with a persuasive case, then the introduction of new laws is probably
unnecessary.
The second area which the Howard Government needed to devote greater emphasis
to is the role public diplomacy can play in improving Australia’s image abroad,
particularly in Southeast Asia. To avoid Australia being tarred with a similar “image
problem” to the United States, “as arrogant, self-indulgent, hypocritical, inattentive,
and unwilling or unable to engage in cross-cultural dialogue”, more effort needs to be
expended in promoting an image of Australia that emphasises tolerance, open-
mindedness, and a commitment to values widely held in many Asian states—the
central role of family, economic prosperity, cultural respect, and education.54  To put it
mildly, snazzy television commercials featuring scantily clad models and backdrops of
Uluru interspersed with indecipherable “Aussie” idioms do not project an image that
will improve Australia’s national profile throughout Southeast Asia, where many still
see Australia as an alien state with little genuine connection to its regional neighbours.
This perception can only aid the cause of those in the region who harbour deep-
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seated grievances against Australia as an “apostate minion” of the United States.
There needs to be less emphasis on Australia’s military contribution to the “war on
terrorism” and more effort devoted to increasing Australia’s soft power in the Asian
region. In the long term, this means diverting more resources to the Department of
Foreign Affairs and Trade to lead a well coordinated diplomatic offensive in the region
aimed at projecting favourable images of Australia, including images that mirror the
genuinely positive role played by moderate members of Australia’s Islamic community
in nation-building. In short, Australia needs to be better at conveying its own
“narrative” in Southeast Asia.
The third area where the Howard Government should have changed its focus was to
actively distinguish Australian counter-terrorism strategy from the counter-terrorism
strategy of the United States. As a first step towards product differentiation, all
references in official statements to a “war on terrorism” should cease. As one writer
points out, “a ‘war against terror’ has no more meaning than a ‘war against poverty’.
It defines no specific threat, does not delineate a precise enemy, and thus defines no
realisable political ends”.55  From a more practical perspective, it merely serves to tie
Australia to an American global counter-terrorist strategy that has, unfortunately, lost
its way since the invasion of Iraq in March 2003. If was serious about combating the
long term threat from Islamic terrorism in particular, the Howard Government needed to
take the politically difficult step of communicating to Washington the view that the
US-led invasion, occupation, and post-occupation role in Iraq continues to have a
corrosive effect on America’s global counter-terrorism strategy. As a former deputy
chief of the CIA’s Counter-Terrorist Centre has written, “Even though much of the
violence that has plagued Iraq since the operation began is unmistakably attributable
to terrorism, the US government undertook the military operation in Iraq primarily for
reasons other than counter-terrorism, feeding Muslim misperceptions and fears that
the United States also has ulterior motives every time it talks about fighting terrorism”.56
The fact that the Bush administration has, rather unhelpfully, identified Iraq as “the
central front in the global war on terror”57  only makes it more difficult for allies such as
Australia to distinguish between failure to stabilise Iraq in the face of an insurgency
onslaught and victories against terrorism on fronts (eg Indonesia) that are more
important to Australia’s national security in the longer term. That said, the Howard
Government could have been more pro-active in making this distinction and in
distancing itself from what looks to be an impossible mission of securing a peaceful,
stable, united, and democratic Iraq. Ill-advised statements from senior Ministers that
simply echo misguided policy settings in Washington make the task all that much
harder.58  It is one thing to talk up the great work the Australian Defence Force is doing
to support nation-building in Iraq; quite another to subscribe to the US view that the
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struggle against a patchwork quilt of insurgents in a manifestly dysfunctional state is
a Manichean contest that will determine whether international terrorism is defeated.
From Australia’s perspective, supporting this simplistic “winner takes all” logic can
only serve to detract from the coherence and credibility of its counter-terrorist strategy
at home and in Southeast Asia.
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